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Petitioners-Appellants Walter and Judith Kimbrough ("Kimbrough"), by and through their 
attorneys of record, Kristen R Thompson of Thompson Law Firm, respectfully submits this 
Appellants' Brief in support of their appeal of the District Court's Judgment and Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law entered April 1, 2009 at the closing of the trail de novo, the Supplemental 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered May 18, 2009 and its Amended Supplemental 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered September 17, 2009, and the Judgment entered 
June 29, 2009. Petitioners-Appellants appeal the verdict of The Honorable Gregory M. Culet, 
District Court Judge, and his findings that the decisions of the Canyon County Board of 
Equalization ("Board of Equalization") and the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals ("Board of Tax 
Appeals") he upheld. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Kimbrough presented before the Third Judicial District Court of the State of Idaho in 
Canyon County on April 1,2009 their case regarding the tax assessment on their property located at 
4288 Dye Lane, Kuna, Canyon County, Idaho. The property consists of approximately 14.76 acres 
designated as agricultural property and taxed accordingly. (Transcript Proceeding of 04/01/09 at 
Page 217 Lines 20-25; Page 218 Lines 1-5). There is no dispute in this action as to the validity of 
the agricultural exemption to Kimhrough's property. (Transcript Proceeding of 04101109 at Page 
229 Lines 7-10). 
The District Court in a trial de novo pursuant to LC. 5 63-3812 was presented evidence, and 
entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. The Court reviewed and ruled on several 
issues that are now presented to this Honorable Court for consideration. 
The first issue on appeal is whether or not, under LC. 5 63-604, the Respondents can 
arbitrarily carve from the agricultural exempt property one (1) acre and the homestead sitting on that 
acre for taxation and negate the agricultural exemption that has historically been applied to the 
property. 
The second issue on appeal is whether IDAPA 35.01.03.645 is consistent and a proper 
application of LC. 5 63-604, and if this tax regulation was followed by the Canyon County 
Assessor's Office when evaluating the Kimbrough property located at 4288 Dye Lane. 
The third issue decided by the District Court was never presented to it in the pleadings by 
either Kimbrough or the Respondents. The District Court in its Supplemental Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law found that once Kimbrough claimed a residential homestead exemption 
pursuant to I.C. 5 63-602G that their property or a portion of their property as arbitrarily defined by 
the Respondents, could no longer qualify as agriculturally exempt property exemption under I.C. 5 
63-604. (Transcript Proceeding of 04/01/09 at Page 21 1 Lines 10-21). 
Finally, Kimbrough brings before the Court the arbitrary and capricious nature of the 
comparative properties the assessor used to assess the Kimbrough property. (Transcript Proceeding 
of 04/01/09 at Page 168 Lines 8-22). Kimbrough believes that improper comparatives were utilized 
in assessing the property, which resulted in the astronomical increase in taxable value of the 
property. ($134,200 in 2006 to $329,875 in 2007). The resulting increase supports Kimbrough's 
position that the comparables and arbitrary assignment of classification of the homestead to one (1) 
acre increased the property value improperly. The Respondents' assessment did not reflect the rural 
nature of the Kimbrough property as required under the statute for comparative analysis. 
(Transcript Proceeding of 04/01/09 at Page 174 Lines 16-25; Page 175 Lines 1-25; Page 176 Lines 
1-22). These values were, therefore, an arbitrary valuation for tax purposes and do not reflect the 
fair market value or full cash value of the property when deemed properly as rural and agricultural. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
1. Kimbrongh's property evaluation on 4288 Dye Lane, Kuna, Canyon County, Idaho 
in 2007 was evaluated at a taxable property value of $329,875. (Transcript Proceeding of 04/01/09 
at Page 220 Lines 1-3). The same property was assessed in 2006 at $134.200. (Transcript 
Proceeding of 04/01/09 at Page 219 Lines 24-25; Page 220 Line 1). Kimbrough filed a Property 
Tax Appeal with the Board of Tax Appeals on August 17,2007 indicating what they believed to be 
the fair market value of their property at $226,130. (Record at Page 000038 - Trial Exhibit 40). 
Kimbrough based this evaluation on the assessor's arbitrary practice of designating one (1) acre of 
active agricultural land as "residential" when the deed to the property held by Kimbrough indicated 
that the entire acreage was zoned "A" or agricultural. 
2. Kimbrough went before the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals on November 28, 2007. 
Kimbrough indicated that the issue on appeal was the market value of the rural property. (Record at 
Page 000038 -Trial Exhibit 42). 
3. The Board of Tax Appeals reviewed the decision of the Board of Equalization and 
held the Board of Equalization's decision increasing the taxes was to be affirmed. (Record at Page 
000038 -Trial Exhibit 45). The Board of Tax Appeals on March 6,2008 determined that there had 
not been errors in the decision of the Board of Equalization and upheld the value of the Dye Lane 
property and therefore affirmed the final evaluation. 
4. Kimbrough appealed this decision to the Board of Tax Appeals, requested a 
rehearing on the matter. The rehearing request was denied on April 1, 2008. (Record at Page 
000038 -Trial Exhibit 47). 
5. Kimbrough then filed a Petition for Judicial Review of Agency Actions on April 25, 
2008, which was presented to the Third District Court of the State of Idaho in and for the County of 
Canyon, the Honorable Gregory M. Culet presiding. At the trial de novo the Judge entered into the 
record various Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and withheld for hrther consideration 
several issues. (Transcript Proceeding of 04101109 at Page 220 Lines 11-17). 
6. The District Court held for further review from its April 1, 2009 Findings of Fact 
and Conclusion of Law the question of whether or not one (1) acre on which the Kimbrough's 
residence is situated could or could not ha& been simultaneously claimed under the residential 
property exemption pursuant to I.C. § 63-602G and retain its agricultural exemption under LC. 5 63- 
604. 
7. The District Court review was whether IDAPA 35.01.03.645 is consistent with I.C. 
5 63-604 and if the tax regulation followed by the Canyon County Assessor's Office when 
evaluating the Kimbrough property on Dye Lane was valid. 
8. In the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the District Court, on 
May 18, 2009, found that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the evaluation on the 
property was incorrect. 
9. On June 25,2009 the District Court issued its Judgment consistent with its Findings 
of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Supplemental Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. 
10. On July 23, 2009 Kimbrough filed a Notice of Appeal with the Idaho Supreme 
Court. This is the appeal that presently lies before this Hoiiorable Court. 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. There is no issue of fact that the Kimbrough property, which is the subject of this 
case was, at the time of the actions and assessment of the Respondents in 2007 and for the four 
(4) years proceeding, exempt and qualified for that exemption under I.C. 5 63-604. (Transcript 
Proceeding of 04101109 at Page 229 Lines 7-10). 
2. Neither Respondents nor Kimbrough presented to the Court the issue of the 
application of to I.C. 5 63-6020 in their pleadings. (Transcript Proceeding of 04101109 at Page 21 1 
Lines 10-25; Page 212 Lines 1-12). 
3. The Respondents applied as the fair market value, a residential property formula for 
all of the property, not just the acre it carved from the property. (Transcript Proceeding of 04101/09 
at Page 215 Lines 10-25; Page 216 Lines 1-19). 
11. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83(f)(6) Kimbrough presents the following issues on appeal: 
1. Did the District Court err in finding that pursuant to LC. 8 63-604 that the one (1) 
acre parcel excluded by the Respondents from the agricultural exempt property was not exempt for 
purposes of taxation? 
2. Did the District Court err when finding that an exemption pursuant to LC. 5 63- 
602G homestead residential property exemption could not be taken on property that was deemed to 
be agriculturally exempt under LC. 8 63-604? 
3. Did the District Court err when finding that IDAPA 35.01.03.645 was not 
inconsistent with I.C. 5 63-604 making the tax regulations followed by the Canyon County 
Assessor's Office? 
4. Did Kimbrough show as a matter of law that the Canyon County Assessor, Canyon 
County Board of Equalization and the Idaho Board of Tax Appeals acted arbitrarily by appraising 
the one (1) acre home site as residential property and the remaining 13.76 acres as irrigated 
agricultural property? 
5. Did the District Court err in finding that Kimbrough had not proven by clear and 
convincing evidence that valuation placed on the property was incorrect? 
111. 
ARGUMENT 
There was no evidence presented in the record to the District Court to uphold the finding 
that I.C. (i 63-6026 the homestead residential property exemption could not be taken on property 
that was also deemed to be agricultural. The District Court erred in finding that LC. 5 63-604 could 
be utilized arbitrarily to carve from a designated agriculturally exempt parcel one (1) acre of ground 
for purposes of taxation and deem it residential. The District Court, in reviewing the Respondents 
interpretation of the statute in its regulations under IDAPA erroneously determined the statute 
allowed the parceling of agriculturally exempt properties in such a fashion. I.C. 5 63-604 is 
improperly being applied by the Respondents in an unallowable extension of its authority under 
IDAPA 35.01.03.645. The Respondents cannot arbitrarily remove a tax exempt status when no 
such instructions are presented by the legislature in the statute to do so. Simply put, the IDAPA 
section 35.01.03.645 interpreting I.C. $ 63-604 denied the statutory exemption under LC. $ 63-604. 
The District Court erred in extending the application of the exclusion for residential property 
exemption with no proper foundation in law. Further, the Court arbitrarily and capriciously 
assigned the homestead residential property exemption under LC. $ 63-602G to the Kimbrough 
property in exclusion of their undisputed agricultural exemption under LC. 63-604. Nowhere in 
the statute does the law allow the Court to so arbitrarily assign the selection of one or the other 
exemption. The Respondents acted arbitrarily by appraising the one (1) acre Kimbrough home site 
as residential property and the remaining 13.76 acres as agricultural property. This Honorable 
Court should reverse the District Court's decision and allow them to maintain their agricultural 
exemption on all of their property. 
A. Standard of Review 
I.C. 5 63-3812(c) provides that, "Appeals [from the Board of Tax Appeals] may be based 
upon any issue presented by the appellant to the board of tax appeals and shall be heard and 
determined by the Court without a jury in a trial de novo on issues in the same manner as though it 
were an original proceeding with the court." 
The case before the Court was reviewed consistent with LC. 5 63-38 12(c) and reviewed in a 
trial de novo by the District Court. Idaho Code 5 63-3812(c) provides that, "Therefore, because a 
trial de novo was conducted in district court pursuant to statute and to I.R.C.P. 84(e)(l), the 
(Supreme) Court will not review the record independently of the district court's appellate decision." 
The normal standard of review for a trial de novo on tax issues is the same as for summary 
judgment, 
"The proper standard of review in this case is the standard generally employed for reviewing 
an appeal from an order of summary judgment. When this Court reviews a district court's decision 
on summary judgment, this Court employs the same standard used by the district court in reviewing 
the motion." Estate of Becker v. Cullahan, 140 Idaho 522, 525, 96 P.3d 623, 626 (2004). 'The 
facts will be construed in favor of the non-moving party," Id "'Summary judgment is apprapriate if 
there are no genuine issues *206**353 of material fact and the case can be decided as a matter of 
law." Id "The construction and application of a legislative act are pure questions of law as to which 
the Supreme Court exercises free review." Roeder Holdings, L. L. C. v. Bd. Of Equalization of Ada 
County, 136 Idaho at 81 1-1 2,4 1 P.3d at 239-40, 
B. The District Caurt erred in finding, pursuant to I.C. 5 63-604, that a one (1) acre 
parcel could be excluded by the Respondents from the agriculturally exempt 
property and was not exempt for purposes of taxation. 
The relevant language of the statute under I.C. $ 63-604 states as follows: 
"(1) For property tax purposes, land which is actively devoted to agriculture shall be eligible for 
appraisal, assessment and taxation as agricultural property each year it meets one (I) or more of 
the following qualifications: 
(a) The total area of such land, including the homesite, is more than five (5) contiguous acres, 
and is actively devoted to agriculture which means: 
(i) It is used to produce field crops including, but not limited to, grains, feed crops, fruits and 
vegetables; or 
(ii) It is used to produce nursery stock as defined in section 22-2302(11). Idaho Code; or 
(iii) It is used by the owner for the grazing of livestock to be sold as part of a for-profit 
enterprise, or is leased by the owner to a bona fide lessee for grazing purposes; or 
(iv) It is in a cropland retirement or rotation program. 
(b) The area of such land is five (5) contiguous acres or less and such land has been actively 
devoted to agriculture within the meaning of subsection (l)(a) of this section during the last three 
(3) growing seasons; and 
(i) It agriculturally produces for sale or home consutnption the equivalent of fifteen percent 
(1 5%) or more of the owner's or lessee's annual gross income; or 
(ii) It agriculturally produced gross revenues in the immediately preceding year of one thousand 
dollars ($1,000) or more. When the area of land is five (5) contiguous acres or less, such land 
shall be presumed to be nonagricultural land until it is established that the requirements of this 
subsection have been met. 
(2) Land shall not be classified or valued as agricultural land which is part of a platted 
subdivision with stated restrictions prohibiting its use for agricultural purposes, whether within 
or without a city." 
Idaho has long recognized agriculture as a key activity in the state. The structure of the 
statutes and even the Idaho Constitution acknowledges the favored position of farming in this state. 
The legislature enacted the tax exemption for agriculture in 1988 and though its location within the 
code has changed the substance of the statue has not changed. (See Ada County Bd. of 
Equalization v. Highlands, Znc. 141 Idaho 202, 108 P.3d 349 Idaho, 2005.) The legislative intent 
of the statute was to economically assist f m e r s  to stay on their farm and produce agricultural 
crops. 
Nowhere in LC. 5 63-604 does this statute state that the Respondents can remove the 
homestead from the exemption and tax it separately. The statute does not address the exclusion of 
the homestead for application of the exemption. In fact, it states just the opposite and includes the 
homestead in the requirements for defining the exemption. Had the legislature wished to exclude the 
residence of the farmer from the exemption, it clearly would have done so. By the Respondents 
interpretation, no farmer could live on their farm and retain their .full agricultural exemption. This is 
not what the legislature intended. 
Further, there is no valid authority for the Respondents to arbitrarily carve out one (1) 
acre of ground and exclude it from the legitimate agricultural exemption that applies to the 
property. "This Court held that the Tax Commission did not have the authority to create 
regulations imposing additional requirements to qualify for the exemption." Roeder Holdings, 
L.L. C. v. Bd Of Equalization ofAda County, 136 Idaho 8 13,41 P.3d 237,241 (2001). 
This Court has ruled that the Respondents cannot substitute its judgment for that of the 
legislature. "In the absence of valid statutory authority, an administrative agency may not, under 
the guise of a regulation, substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or exercise its 
sublegislative powers to modify, alter, enlarge or diminish provisions of a legislative act that is 
being administered." Roberts v. Transportation Dep't, 121 Idaho 727, 827 P.2d 1178 
(Ct.App.1991) affd 121 Idaho 723,827 P.2d 1174 (1992). 
To exclude the homestead from the farm makes no logical sense when viewed with the 
intent of the statute to assist agriculture in its operation in Idaho. Logically, no farm house, or 
farmer could fbnction and live on their farm and still maintain their exemption. The statute 
exempts the property, "including the homestead." "When interpreting a legislative enactment, 
our primary objective is to derive the Legislature's intent in enacting the statute." Huyden Luke 
Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,3 12, 109 P.3d 161, 166 (2005). 
The Respondents have further complicated the issue by arbitrarily assigning one (1) acre 
to the homestead. There is nothing in the statute, I.C. § 63-604, that supports this action, but 
once the step is made to insert the exclusion of the homestead from the agricultural exemption 
that applies, then the Respondents feel compelled to grant itself further authority by applying a 
one (1) acre standard to the Kimbrough property. The Respondents assessor in testimony 
arbitrarily applied and further explained his reach. (Transcript Proceeding of 04101109 at Page 149 
Lines 10-25 and Page 150 Lines 1-2). What if the hired help had an additional residence on the 
property, would the Respondents then have the authority to expand its exclusion ofthe legitimate 
agricultural exemption to more property? Could a farmer then never house his hired help 
without losing his agricultural exemption on that property as well? And where in the statue do 
the Respondents find the authority to take from the farmer the exemption that the legislature 
intended to give? 
The statute is clear on its face. The Respondents fail to see this clearly as their error in 
application and IDAPA have been compounded through appraisals and application. Idaho Code 
63 5 604 does not say the homestead five (5) acres, it says the homestead a d  five (5) acres. 
If the legislature had meant the exemption to just apply to the farm land it would not have stated 
"the homestead." 
"Thus, statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. Id. If the 
statutory language is unambiguous, we need not engage in statutory construction and are free to 
apply the statute's plain meaning. On the other hand, if the statutory language is ambiguous, we 
must examine the proffered interpretations and consider the 'context in which [the] language is 
used, the evils to be remedied and the objects in view.' " Id. 
The context of this statute is agriculture. The Respondents have over stepped their 
authority by removing the homestead from the undisputed agricultural exemption. 
C. The District Court erred when finding that an exemption pursuant to I.C. $ 63-602G 
homestead residential property exemption could not be taken on property that was 
deemed to be agriculturally exempt under I.C. $63-604. 
A review of I.C. 5 63-602G yields nothing that would prevent a farmer from taking his 
agricultural exemption and claiming a residential exemption on the homestead of his property. 
Equally important, the legislature enacted the homestead exemption at LC. 5 63-6020 after it 
enacted the agricultural exemption in 1988. Therefore, had it intended to make the application of 
the exemption exclusive or an alternate exemption to the exemption allowed under LC. 5 63-604, it 
could have done so. In the recent case of Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 216 P.3d 130 Idaho, 
2009, Jul 07, 2009, the Court stated, "As such, when interpreting a statute, this Court presumes 
the Legislature did not intend to change the common law unless the language of the statute 
clearly indicates otherwise. Tkomson v. City oflewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 478, 50 P.3d 488, 493 
(2002). Generally, this same rule applies in determining whether the Legislature intended to 
repeal an existing statute. See State v. Davidson, 78 Idaho 553, 559, 309 P.2d 21 1, 215 (1957). In 
some instances, however, the Legislature may repeal a statute by implication. See State v. 
Roderick, 85 Idaho 80, 83-84, 375 P.2d 1005, 1006-07 (1962). Repeal by implication occurs 
when "two statutes are inconsistent and irreconcilable." Id. at 83, 375 P.2d at 1006. Courts 
disfavor repeal by implication and, therefore, attempt to interpret seemingly conflicting statutes 
in a manner that gives effect to both provisions. Id. at 84, 375 P.2d at 1007; Davidson, 78 Idaho 
at 559, 309 P.2d at 215. "Where two statutes, governing the same subject, can be reconciled and 
construed so as to give effect to both, no repeal occurs, and it is the duty of the courts to so 
construe them." Roderick, 85 Idaho at 84,375 P.2d at 1007." 
While the Respondents may wish them to be irreconcilable, they are not. There is no 
repeal of the agricultural exemption by the enactment of LC. § 63-6020 and the statutes can be 
easily reconciled by allowing Kimbrough to take first the undisputed agricultural exemption and 
then to apply the homeowners exemption. 
Moreover, neither statute allows the Respondents or the District Court to select which of the 
two exemptions Kimbroughs may apply to their property. This is an impermissible extension of 
authority that must be disallowed by this Court. The Court must give effect to both statutes until or 
if the legislature chooses to change either. 
D. The District Court erred when finding that IDAPA 35.01.03.645 was not inconsistent 
with I.C. 5 63-604. 
As discussed previously IDAPA 35.01.03.645 is an improper extension of I.C. 5 63-604 and 
must be revised to be consistent with the intent and language of the statute. 
E. Idaho statute shows as a matter of law the evaluation by the Canyon County 
Assessor's Office was improper and placed an improper value on the Appellants' 
property. 
The Respondents based their assessment on bare land sales in the subjects "general areas." 
These involved lots of .5 acre, 1.0 acre, .73 acre, and .77 acre sold in 2006. The comparable sales or 
properties were however located in town and not in a nual setting as is the subject property. 
(Transcript Proceeding of 04/01/09 at Page 112 Lines 8-25; Page 113 Lines 1-25; Page 114 Lines 1- 
25; Page 115 Lines 1-25 and Page 116 Lines 1-13) The appraiser's argument is circular and an 
improper application of the statute. His logic is based upon an application of the administmtive rule 
IDAPA 35.01.03.645 that the Kimbrough property was residential and did not qualify for the 
agricultural exemption. Therefore, he looked to other comparable residences in non-agricultural 
areas to evaluate the home and then craved out one (1) acre for evaluation. He selected the 
comparables based on a position that they could "potentially" (Transcript Proceeding of 04/01/09 at 
Page 115 Lines 20-25 and Page 116 Lines 1-13) be used for agriculture but had no agricultural 
exemption on them. How then can the comparables be comparable to the Kimbrough property that 
does have the agricultural exemption? The Respondents are struggling with their own 
methodology to exclude the agricultural exemption that applies to Kimbrough when a proper 
reading of the statute would be to allow the exemption on the property in total. 
The Respondents appraiser furher evaluated several outbuildings that are on the "homestead 
property" inclusive with the homestead evaluation. These values have no support and therefore 
should be denied. "An "arbitrary valuation" for tax purposes is one that does not reflect the fair 
market value or full cash value of the property." Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 141 
Idaho 316, 109 P.3d 170 (205). Kimbrough believes that the evaluation as presented by the 
Respondents is just such an arbitrary valuation and should be set aside. 
If this Court allows the Respondents to extend their authority to change the exemption on 
the Kimbrough property, then it must remand this portion of the case for a proper assessment of 
the property. 
F. Appellants are entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
Under I.C. 5 12-1 17(1), "Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or 
civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other 
taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, 
witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment 
is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Therefore, if the Appellants prevail, 
they ask that this Court award attorney's fees and costs for the appeal and the District Court action. 
IV. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There was no evidence presented in the record to the District Court to uphold the finding 
that LC. 5 63-602G the homestead residential property exemption could not be taken on property 
that was also deemed to be agriculturally exempt. The District Court erred in finding that LC. 5 63- 
604 could be utilized arbitrarily to carve from a designated agriculturally exempt parcel one (1) acre 
of ground for purposes of taxation and deem it residential. The District Court, in reviewing the 
Respondents interpretation of the statute in its regulations under IDAPA erroneously determined the 
statute allowed the parceling of agriculturally exempt properties in such a fashion. Idaho Code 5 
63-604 is improperly being applied by the Respondents in an unallowable extension of its authority 
under IDAPA 35.01.03.645. The Respondents cannot arbitrarily remove a tax exempt status when 
no such instructions are presented by the legislature in the statute to do so. Simply put, the IDAPA 
section 35.01.03.645 enforcing LC. 5 63-604 extends the statute to deny Kimbrough proper and 
undisputed exemption under I.C. 5 63-604. The District Court erred in extending the application of 
the exclusion for residential property exemption with no proper foundation in law. 
Further, the Court arbitrarily and capriciously assigned the homestead residential property 
exemption under LC. 5 63-602G to the Kimbrough property in exclusion of their undisputed 
agricultural exemption under I.C. 3 63-604. Nowhere in the statute does the law allow the court to 
so arbitrarily assign the selection of one or the other exemption. The Respondents acted arbitrarily 
by appraising the one (1) acre Kimbrough home site as residential property and the remaining 13.76 
acres as agricultural property. This Honorable Court should reverse the District Court's decision 
and allow them to maintain their agricultural exemption on all 14.76 acres. 
If this Court finds that the Respondents acted properly in extending its authority under LC. 5 
63-604 and the assignment of one or the other of the exemptions available to Kimbrough under 
alternatively I.C. 5 63-6026 was proper, then the Respondents must find comparable properties to 
make its assessment of the Kimbrough property in its calculation for tax purposes. 
By statute, the Appellants are entitled to attorney's fees and cost, which should be awarded 
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